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ILLINOIS SHOULD EXPLICITLY ADOPT THE PER SE RULE
FOR CONSUMER FRAUD ACT VIOLATIONS
James 0. Latturner*

The Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices
Act ("CFA")' provides basic, comprehensive protection for consumers, borrowers, and businessmen
against fraud, unfair competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in any trade or commerce. The primary purpose of the
CFA is to protect consumers
"Illinois courts have failed to

address the [per se rule] issue

comprehensively or
consistently."
against losses caused by overreaching or fraudulent conduct. 2 In addition to the CFA, there are numerous federal and state
specialized consumer protection
statutes that regulate specific types
of activities, such as installment
credit purchases, 3 wage assignments, 4 and various trade activistudios5 and
ties such as dance
6
travel promotion.
This article examines the integral relationship between these regulatory statutes and the CFA, since
a violation of a regulatory statute
also may constitute a violation of
the CFA. The issue is particularly
important where the regulatory
statute provides no private cause
of action for damages, and the
injured consumer must look to the
CFA for relief.7 Other states have8
adopted a per se violation rule,
whereby a violation of any statute
designed to protect consumers automatically constitutes a violation
of the state's general consumer
fraud statute. However, Illinois
courts have failed to address the
issue comprehensively or consistently. Applying the CFA's liberal
construction mandate and the statutorily incorporated FTC standard, Illinois courts should adopt a
per se violation rule for CFA violations.
A

A. States That Have Adopted
The Per Se Rule
Statutes similar to the CFA,
commonly referred to as "Unfair
and Deceptive Acts and Practices"
statutes ("UDAPs") are found in
almost all states. 9 In some states, a
violation of a specific state or
federal consumer protection statute is a per se violation of the state
UDAP. For example, Dial Corp v.
Manghnani Inv. Corp.'0 was an
action based on violations of the
federal Lanham Trade-Mark Act"
and the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act ("CUTPA"). The
court first determined that the defendant had violated the federal
statute. It then considered the language of the state statute, which
provided that "[n]o person shall
engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or business."' 3 Based on
the statute and deceptive trade
practice standards set by the Federal Trade Commission,' 4 the
court expressly adopted the per se
rule, stating that "[t]o the extent
defendants' actions violated the
Lanham Act... they should be held
automatically to violate CUTPA.'1 5
Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G.,
Inc.' 6 was an action by an employer
against a personnel agency for losses due to embezzlement by an
employee recommended by the
agency. The plaintiff alleged that
defendant had violated Chapter 95
of the North Carolina statutes 7 by
publishing and making false and
fraudulent representations concerning the applicant, and that
such actions also constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices
under the state UDAP.' 8 After the
jury found a violation of the former, the trial court ruled, as a
matter of law, that the defendant
also had violated the UDAP.
Chapter 95 is enforceable by the
North Carolina Commissioner of
Labor, but the statute provides no

private right of action.' 9 However,
the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the provisions found in
Chapter 95 were designed to protect consumers. It thus held that
"[p]roof of fraud [under Chapter
95] necessarily constitutes a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts," 2 0 and
therefore consumers could sue to
remedy the fraud.
Similarly, In re Scrimpsher2 ' involved a counterclaim against a
creditor for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") 22 and the Consumer Protection From Deceptive
Acts and Practices article of the
New York General Business
Laws. 23 There, the court found that
the creditor had violated the
FDCPA and that the violation
therefore "subjects [the creditor] to
concurrent liability under. . . the
New York General Business
Law. '

24

"In some states, aviolation of
a specific state or federal
consumer protection statute
is a per se violation of the
state UDAP."
In Salois v. Mutual of Omaha

Ins. Co.,25 the defendant had vio-

lated the insurance code by failing
to act in good faith and fair dealing. The Washington Supreme
Court specifically stated that "defendant's actions were a per se
violation" of the Washington ConAct
Protection
sumer
("WCPA"). 26 Like the Illinois
CFA, the WCPA prohibits unfair
or deceptive acts and practices and
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has expressly incorporated the deceptive trade practices standards
set by the FTC.
B. Liberal Construction and
the FTC Standard
The CFA makes unlawful all
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices including but not limited to
the use or employment of any
deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, misrepresentation
or the concealment, suppression or
omission of any material fact....-27
The Illinois legislature expressly
provided that, to affect its intended purpose, courts are to liberally
construe CFA provisions. 28 In
Duhl v. Nash Realty,29 the court
found that the Illinois legislature
intended that "the courts of this
State utilize the [CFA] to the utmost degree in eradicating all
forms of deceptive and unfair business practices and grant appropriate remedies to injured parties."3 0
The Illinois legislature also
made it clear that in determining
what conduct is prohibited by the
CFA, "consideration should be
given to the interpretations of the
Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act," 3' which also
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts
and practices. In FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 3 2 the United
States Supreme Court adopted the
following FTC standards to determine whether an act or practice is
unfair or deceptive:
(1) [W]hether the practice offends public policy as established by statutes, at common
law, or otherwise or is within
at least the penumbra of some
common law, statutory or
other established concept of
unfairness;
(2) whether the practice is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and
(3) whether the practice
causes substantial injury to
consumers or competitors.33
For purposes of this discussion
the first standard, offending public
policy as established by statute, is
most pertinent. This standard, statutorily incorporated into the
CFA, supports a per se rule: an act
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is per se unfair if it violates either
the letter or the public policy of a
statute intended to protect consumers. A per se rule also is consistent with the liberal construction
mandate of the CFA. If a statute is
intended by the legislature to protect consumers, finding that violating that statute also violates the
CFA would "utilize the [CFAJ to
the utmost degree in eradicating all
forms of deceptive and unfair business practices." Under such a per
se rule, if the legislature prohibits
an act, then performing the act
automatically constitutes an unfair
or deceptive practice under the
CFA. Conversely, if the legislature
specifically allows an action, then
performing the act does not violate
the CFA.
1. Applying the FrC Standard
and the Liberal Construction
Mandate of the CFA.
Several Illinois courts have
properly applied the liberal construction mandate and FTC stan-

"[A]n act is per se unfair if it
violates either the letter or the
public policy of a statute
intended to protect
consumers."
dard in accordance with this reasoning. While some decisions
reflect an express deference to the
FTC standards,3 4 others have
adopted the analysis by implication. 35 In either case, this line of
decisions interpreting the CFA has
developed with a consistency of
reasoning that was intended by the
liberal construction mandate of the
CFA.
In Hurlbert v. Cottier,36 the court
invoked the liberal construction
requirement of the CFA and applied the FTC standard to sustain a
cause of action that, on its face, did
not meet the requirements of the
CFA. There, the defendant had
installed aluminum siding on the
plaintiff's house. The plaintiff sued
to rescind the contract pursuant to
Section 262B of the CFA, which
provides that under certain cir-

cumstances the "consumer may
avoid the contract or sale

. . .

by

returning to the seller, in its original condition, any merchandise
delivered to him under the contract or sale."' 37 The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff
could not meet the requirements of
section 262B because once the siding was installed, it could not be
returned in its original condition.
The court noted that the CFA is
to be liberally construed and "that
the legislature intended consultation of Federal laws and Federal
court decisions generally when the
Illinois Statute appears deficient." 38 Extending this reasoning
to the facts of the case, the court
found that the rescission provision
of the federal Truth-In-Lending
Act ("TILA") 9 was most akin to
the CFA, except that the TILA was
more expansive. The TILA's rescission provision also requires
that the rescinding party return
any property received, "except that
if the return of the property in kind
would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its
reasonable value." 40 In holding
that "the legislature intended that
any gaps [in the CFA] be supplied
by judicial construction," the Hurlbert court adopted the TILA return
of reasonable value provision
when the goods could not be returned "in their original condition," as required by section 262B
of the CFA.
The Elder v. Coronet Insurance
Co. 4 1 court held that a CFA violation may be premised upon violating the public policy of another
statute. Elder was an action alleging that an insurance company
violated the CFA by denying
claims solely based on the result of
polygraph examinations. The court
held that such use of polygraph
tests violated the public policy of
43
the Illinois civil 42 and criminal
statutes and the Federal Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of
1988.44 Notably, the court did not
expressly find that the defendants
had violated the letter of any of the
statutes. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the practice constituted an unfair and deceptive act
under the CFA.
(continued on page 66)
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In numerous other cases, courts
have implicitly applied the liberal
construction mandate and the FTC
standard and held that a violation
of public policy or a regulatory
statute also violates the CFA. For
example, in Logsdon v. Shelter
Mut. Ins. Co.,45 the court held that
breaching the Illinois Insurance
Code46 duty to offer underinsured
motorist coverage also supported a
CFA cause of action. Likewise, the
Mario's
Butcher Shop v. Armour &
Co.4 7 court held that the federal
Wholesome Meat Act standards
and regulations, 48 which provide
no private cause of action for civil
damages, "may properly be applied to a lawsuit brought under
the CFA." Finally, in Fisher v.
Samuels,49 the court adopted the
presumed public injury standard
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193450 to

sustain an action under the CFA
without specific allegations of actual harm to the public. 5 1
In addition, the Illinois courts
have applied the FTC standard to
the reverse situation. That is, if the
defendant's conduct is authorized
by another statute, the conduct
may not violate the CFA. For
example, in Lanier v. Associates
Finance, Inc.,52 the installment
loan contract creditor disclosed
that prepayment rebates would be
governed by the "Rule of 78's."
The creditor did not explain this
Rule or indicate that it constitutes
a penalty for prepayment. The
plaintiff sued the defendant under
the CFA for failing to disclose and
explain the material facts and effect of using the Rule of 78's.
However, no Illinois statute required such an explanation and the
Federal Reserve Board, in adopting Regulation Z, prohibited explaining such complex mathematical equations as the Rule of 78's
because they detract from other
important disclosures. 53 Therefore,
the court found that the creditor
adequately disclosed both the annual percentage rate and the method of computation, as required by
66

the TILA.
The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs CFA claim
because complying with the TILA
disclosure requirements is a defense to liability under the CFA.
The court noted that section
10(b)(l) of the CFA precludes liability under the CFA when "actions or transactions [are] specifically authorized by laws
administered by any regulatory
body or officer acting under statuthis State or the
tory authority of
'54
United States."
Where Illinois and federal statutes contain conflicting provisions,
courts have applied the standard

"[T]he [Illinois] legislature has
expressly directed the courts
to look to other statutes to
determine whether or not
there is a violation of the
CFA."
set by the Illinois statute. In Laughlin v. Evanston Hospital,5 5 the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in a differential
price fixing scheme prohibited by
the Illinois Antitrust Act 5 6 and the
federal Clayton Act.57 One count
alleged a violation of the Illinois
Antitrust Act and the other count
alleged a CFA claim based on a
violation of the Clayton Act.
The court first held that no
Illinois Antitrust Act violation existed because price discrimination
in and of itself is not an unreasonable restraint of trade, and because
the plaintiffs actions were excluded from the Antitrust Act's prohibitions. The court then acknowledged that the price fixing activity
did violate the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 58
The court noted that the Illinois
legislature did not prohibit price
discrimination under the Illinois
Antitrust Act. Concluding that the
CFA was not intended as an "addi-

tional antitrust enforcement mechanism," the court held that "[it
would be inconsistent to provide
that the very conduct which is not
sufficient to state a cause of action
under the Antitrust Act is sufficient to state a cause of action
under the Consumer Fraud Act." 5 9
The foregoing cases represent
implicit adherence to a per se
violation rule, although none explicitly have adopted that approach. Thus, the CFA may be
violated when another statute is
violated, as in Logsdon, Mario's,
and Fisher, or even when other
laws are not specifically violated
but the underlying public policy is,
as was the case in Hurlbert and
Elder. The reverse was held true in
Lanier,in that the CFA may not be
violated where a particular statute
permits the defendant's conduct.
Where state and federal laws conflicted, the Laughlincourt deferred
to the state law in evaluating the
CFA claim.
2. Ignoring the Liberal
Construction Provision and
the FTC Standard.
A conflicting strand of cases has
surfaced that completely depart
from the FTC standard and thereby distort the purposes of the CFA.
In People ex rel. Daley v. Grady,60
for example, the court expressly
refused to apply the per se rule in
evaluating a CFA claim. The case
involved a two count complaint,
both counts alleging violations of
the CFA. Count I alleged a CFA
claim based on the defendant's
failure to fulfill his promises regarding the sale of property and his
misrepresentations regarding his
refund policy. Count II alleged that
the defendant violated the Illinois
Real Estate License Act of 1983
("RELA")61 by engaging in the
practice of real estate without a
license. Count II further alleged
that the RELA violation was a per
se violation of the CFA.
Although the appellate court
sustained Count I, it dismissed
Count II, concluding that even if
Volume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990
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the defendant had violated the
RELA, that violation would not
per se constitute a violation of the
CFA. The court reasoned that section 20 of the CFA62 specifically
incorporated several statutes, the
violation of which automatically
constituted CFA violations. Because the RELA was not among
those statutes listed, a violation of
the RELA was not
per se a viola63
tion of the CFA.
The Grady court interpreted as
exhaustive the statutes listed in
section 20 of the CFA. Section 20
does not purport to be an exhaustive list of which statutes will support a per se CFA violation. By
isolating section 20 from the
CFA's liberal construction mandate and the incorporated FTC
standard, the court failed to interpret the CFA as a whole in light of
the statute's expansive remedial
purposes.
In Holmes v. No. 2 Galesburg
Crown Finance64 the court also
refused to apply the per se violation rule. There, the defendant
violated the Illinois Consumer Installment Loan Act ("CILA") 65 by
failing to comply with the disclosure requirements of the CILA and
by creating an impermissible security interest. The plaintiffs alleged
that the CILA violations constituted a violation of the CFA "as a
matter of law." Without any discussion of the FTC standard or the
liberal construction mandate of the
CFA, the Holmes court held that
although "it may be possible for
facts to exist wherein an impermissible security interest would be a
violation of the Consumer Fraud
Act, we believe that there is no
such 66
violation here as a matter of
law."

Finally, Fitzgerald v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co.67 suggests that a
CFA claim may not be found even
though a federal consumer protection statute is violated. Fitzgerald
involved a CFA challenge to a title
company's practice of paying allowances or rebates to institutions
that purchased title services for
real estate buyers and sellers. The
consumers actually paid the bills
upon which the rebate was based
but were not
aware of nor received
68
the rebate.
Volume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

The court indicated that not
every federal law violation necessarily constitutes a CFA violation.
Although the court found that the
defendant had violated the federal
Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974,69 the court independently analyzed the facts in order
to find a CFA violation. The court
reasoned that the CFA requires
that federal law be considered only
where there is a lack of Illinois case
precedent in the area. The case
further suggests that factual allegations must track the specific language of the CFA in order to
properly state a cause of action.
In Grady and Holmes, the court
rejected CFA claims based solely
on a per se violation argument. In
Fitzgerald,the Illinois Supreme
Court declined to address the per
se claim after a cause of action had
"The per se violation rule
comports with the purpose of
the CFA, its liberal

construction requirement, and

the statutorily incorporated
FTC standard."
been established by specific allegations of unfair and deceptive practices. In light of the above cases,
when another statute has defined,
explicitly or by implication, what
acts or practices are unfair or deceptive, then performing these acts
may be actionable under the CFA.
However, the CFA cause of action
exists only because the defendant's
action is unfair or deceptive, and
not solely because it violates the
another statute. Although this appears to be mere semantics, it often
forms, as seen above, the difference between obtaining relief and
having the case dismissed. Thus,
until the Illinois Supreme Court
definitively decides whether to
adopt a per se rule, it is imperative
in pleading a cause of action under
the CFA to show why the violation
of the underlying statute also is an
unfair and deceptive act or practice under the CFA.
C. The Need For A Per Se Rule
The problem with cases that do

not consider a violation of another
statute per se to constitute a cause
of action under the CFA is that
they fail to fully apply the analysis
required by the CFA. The CFA
prohibits actions that are unfair
and deceptive. To determine
whether an action is unfair or
deceptive the courts are to consider the FTC standard and decide
whether the practice offends public
policy as established by other statutes. Thus, the legislature has expressly directed the courts to look
to other statutes to determine
whether or not there is a violation
of the CFA.
The cases discussed in subsection 2, above, ignore the fact that
another statute was violated. These
cases look solely to the express
CFA prohibitions and determine
what is unfair or deceptive under
the CFA on a case-by-case basis,
without reference to other statutes.
In Fitzgerald, for example, the
court found that the alleged practice violated a federal statute.70 In
spite of this finding, the court still
considered whether the plaintiffs
established a deceptive practices
claim with proof of: (1) a deceptive
act or practice, (2) an intent by
defendants that the plaintiff rely
on the deception, and (3) the deception occurred in the course of
conduct7 involving a trade or commerce. '
This approach has two major
defects. First, the value of other
consumer protection legislation is
unnecessarily diminished when
these protections are not also used
as a standard under the CFA. In
many cases these other statutes do
not provide a private cause of
action.
Second, the case-by-case approach diminishes the objective
standard needed by both businesses and consumers to determine,
without litigation, what conduct is
lawful. A statute determines if a
practice is unfair or deceptive before any actions are taken. Rejecting the per se rule in favor of a
case-by-case analysis requires that
parties litigate to determine whether the acts constituting a violation
of these other statutes also constitute a CFA violation. These prob(continued on page 68)
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The Per Se Rule (continued from page 67)

lems, and the confusion caused by
inconsistent applications of the liberal construction mandate of the
CFA, could be avoided were Illinois to adopt a per se rule for
determining what is unfair and
deceptive conduct under the CFA.
D. Conclusion
The Consumer Fraud Act prohibits and makes actionable unfair
and deceptive acts and practices.
In determining whether an act is
unfair to consumers, courts should
look to whether the act violates
another statute intended to protect
consumers. Illinois should adopt
the rule that a violation of another
consumer protection statute is a
per se violation of the CFA. This
would allow wronged consumers to
recover for damages suffered by
such acts.
The per se violation rule comports with the purpose of the CFA,
its liberal construction requirement, and the statutorily incorporated FTC standard. It also would
decrease the confusion and uncertainty on the part of business and
consumers in determining what
conduct actually violates the CFA.
Only by adopting the per se rule
will the intent and purpose of the
CFA be achieved in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Significantly, the cases in Illinois that
have failed to apply the per se
violation rule have simply ignored
the liberal construction mandate
and the FTC standard. No compelling argument has been stated in
opposition to the per se rule.
The Illinois Supreme Court has
not definitively decided whether
violating a consumer protection
statute per se is a violation of the
CFA. Until the court does so, it is
good practice, if not imperative, to
plead and establish facts showing
why the violation of the underlying
statute is also an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the CFA.
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